





I\MINTER 19811Congressman Reuss called it the most sig-
nificant piece of financial legislation since the
1930's, and Senator Proxmire went even
further and called it the most important piece
oflegislation since the Federal Reserve Act of
1913. But that disagreement aside, few obser-
vers would deny that the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 - the MCA - will strongly influence
the direction of banking and financial activity
in coming decades.
Through the MCA, Congress promoted
greater competition in financial markets, pri-
marily by providing for the phase-out of de-
posit interest-rate ceilings and a broadening of
asset and payment powers of banks and thrift
institutions. Congress also promoted greater
equity and improved monetary control by
extending reserve requirements (following a
phase-in period) to all depository institutions
with transaction (check-type) accounts and
nonpersonal time deposits. This step helped to
solve the problem of declining Federal
Reserve membership, by reducing the cost of
reserve requirements for member banks and
imposing similar reserve requirements on all
insured depository institutions. Moreover,
Congress promoted greater efficiency in cor-
respondent-banking markets, by providing
access to Federal Reserve services, at explicit
prices, for all depository institutions subject to
reserve requirements. To highlight the impor-
tance ofthe legislation, this issue ofthe Review
considers its implications in two major areas -
monetary policy and pricing of Federal
Reserve services.
On the monetary control issue, Michael A.
Klein analyzes several sweeping changes aris-
ing from the MCA - including those sections
that don't directly address that specific issue.
First, he discusses the role of reserve require-
ments in facilitating money-stock control
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when the Federal Reserve uses an aggregate-
reserves measure as its control instrument, as
it has done for the past year and a half. (In
October 1979, the Fed changed its open-
market operating procedures to place more
emphasis on the control of bank reserves and
less emphasis on tightly pegging the cost of
bank reserves, the Federal-funds rate.) He
presents criteria for evaluating reserve-
requirement systems, and develops an argu-
ment for uniform required reserves on all ac-
counts included in the monetary aggregate
targeted by the authorities, within the context
of a simple deposit-multiplier model that
includes both member and nonmember banks.
Klein shows that such a regime serves to
reduce the number of disturbances that
impinge on the money stock, and thereby
facilitates monetary control. In other words,
the imposition of uniform required reserves
reduces the extent of multiplier uncertainty.
His analysis also indicates, however, that two
provisions ofthe legislation - a sharply higher
reserve requirement on transaction accounts
exceeding $25 million than on smaller
amounts, and the imposition of required
reserves on nonpersonal time deposits - are
inconsistent with the logic of a regime of
uniform required reserves when the
authorities' aim is to control a transactions
aggregate.
Klein next examines the effects of the new
law on the monetary-control problems caused
by the process of financial innovation. Two
forms of bank regulation - differential
reserve-requirements on alternative deposit
accounts, and deposit interest-rate ceilings -
have induced a number of innovations in
recent decades. Klein's analysis supports other
criticisms ofinterest-rate ceilings, by showing
that such ceilings tend to induce shifts offunds
among different deposit liabilities in responseto interest-rate fluctuations. But the same
analysis shows that deregulation will signifi-
cantly improve monetary control by reducing
the degree ofmultiplier uncertainty caused by
such shifts offunds.
More importantly, deregulation will signifi-
cantly retard regulation-induced financial
innovation, by allowing depository institutions
to compete for funds by paying market-deter-
mined interest rates. However, the differential
between transaction-account and time-account
reserve requirements will continue to
encourage innovation, although less so than in
the past.
Klein argues that the new types of transac-
tion accounts developed in recent years clearly
exemplify the innovations generated by
regulations. "Such innovations have con-
siderably complicated the task of monetary
control by altering the relation between the
(old) targeted monetary aggregates and
nominal GNP and inflation. Thus in an
environment of deregulation, the definitions
of the aggregates should be more meaningful
economically and, therefore, should be more
useful for the conduct of monetary policy."
Turning to the pricing issue, Gary Zimmer-
man examines the impact ofMCA pricing and
access provisions on the market for correspon-
dent-banking services. In the pre-MCA
environment, Federal Reserve Banks provided
correspondent services to member banks free
of charge. But nonmember banks, being
denied direct access to these services, had to
produce them internally or rely on (member)
private correspondents.
The passage of the MCA was a major
breakthrough in the rationalization ofthe cor-
respondent-banking system. As Zimmerman
argues, it opens the door to equal treatment of
all institutions with respect to pricing of (and
access to) Federal Reserve services.
Zimmerman argues that, in the pre-MCA
environment, free Federal Reserve services
represented a major source of inefficiency in
the correspondent-banking system. "First,
this situation led to overconsumption of Fed
services by member banks. Also, by causing
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the overproduction of publicly produced cor-
respondent services, this pricing policy
resulted in an inefficient allocation of
resources."
He thus raises the questions: to what extent
will MCA provisions enhance competition and
improve market efficiency? Also, after the
implementation ofMCA, will Federal Reserve
Banks be able to compete with private banks
offering these services? He presents evidence
suggesting that Federal Reserve Banks do not
have a natural monopoly in providing any cor-
respondent services (except possibly auto-
mated clearinghouse services) - and that in
many cases, Reserve Banks produce higher-
than-optimal levels ofsuch services.
In Zimmerman's view, " 'Full cost' pricing
as implementedunder the MCA will not elimi-
nate all of the subsidies to institutions using
Fed services. However, it will provide Reserve
Bank customers with market signals concern-
ing the true cost ofthe services they consume,
providing strong incentives for more efficient
use of the services produced."
Zimmerman argues that the post-MCA
world will be more competitive and efficient as
a result of the partial or complete elimination
of Federal Reserve subsidies to depository
institutions. He notes that removal of check-
processing subsidies will allow private pro-
ducers to compete on a more equal footing
with Reserve Banks. On the other hand, he
points out that cash-handling services will con-
tinue to be subsidized, but will be available to
all depository institutions rather than just
member banks.
Zimmerman notes, however, the special
nature of automated clearinghouse services.
The Federal Reserve's published pricing
schedule indicates a short-run willingness to
continue subsidies, so that the market grows
sufficiently for Reserve Banks to take advan-
tage of their economies of scale in this area.
"This would permit lower ACH transfer costs,
making them more competitive with check-
clearing costs, and thereby helping to reduce
the burden on the nation's check-payments
system."